First Impression of the unified Sentinel and Defender XDR Portal

On April 3rd, 2024, Microsoft’s new Unified Portal became public preview, where anyone running their Sentinel SIEM can connect it to the Microsoft Defender XDR Portal (Security.Microsoft.com).

My thought is that you would want this because Copilot for Security would be more helpful, and also it reduces the inevitable pivot that must occur when you start off in Sentinel and then have to switch to the Defender XDR Portal to perform a deeper investigation, say for example within MDE Timeline, or an MDO Email Investigation.

Unify the two portals into one!

The first step is to browse to the Defender XDR Portal and then click “Connect a workspace”

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You should then see the Log Analytics Workspace to connect.

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The last step is to click the Connect Button.

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What to expect when the workspace is connected
  • Log tables, queries, and functions in the Microsoft Sentinel workspace will also be available in advanced hunting within Microsoft Defender XDR.
  • The ‘Microsoft Sentinel Contributor’ role will be assigned to the ‘Microsoft Threat Protection’ and ‘WindowsDefenderATP’ apps within the subscription.
  • Active Microsoft Security incident creation rules will be deactivated to avoid duplicate incidents. This change will only apply to incident creation rules for Microsoft alerts and not to other analytics rules.
  • All alerts related to Microsoft Defender XDR products will be streamed directly from the main Microsoft Defender XDR data connector to ensure consistency. Make sure you have incidents and alerts from this connector turned on in the workspace.

What I observed in my Sentinel instance is the incident creation rules were not deactivated. They were still enabled.

What concerned me the most was the deactivation of the Security Incident Creation Rules. Even though it sounds good on the surface to avoid duplicate incidents, the concern I had is for customers who have an MSSP monitoring their Sentinel Instance, as this would cut off their visibility into those incidents, unless the MSSP somehow transitions to using the Unified Portal, which is not scalable (yet) to allow a SOC analyst to triage multiple incidents in the same view.

“Alerts and incidents from Microsoft Defender XDR (those items which populate the SecurityAlert and SecurityIncident tables) are ingested into and synchronized with Microsoft Sentinel at no charge. For all other data types from individual Defender components (such as DeviceInfo, DeviceFileEvents, EmailEvents, and so on), ingestion will be charged.

Once the Microsoft Defender XDR integration is connected, the connectors for all the integrated components and services (Defender for Endpoint, Defender for Identity, Defender for Office 365, Defender for Cloud Apps, Microsoft Entra ID Protection) will be automatically connected in the background if they weren’t already. If any component licenses were purchased after Microsoft Defender XDR was connected, the alerts and incidents from the new product will still flow to Microsoft Sentinel with no additional configuration or charge”
Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/microsoft-365-defender-sentinel-integration#connecting-to-microsoft-defender-xdr

So far based on our testing, the alerts from Defender are still visible by Lighthouse, so testing helped alleviate this concern.

Table Synchronization

My first test was to see if the synchronization of the SentinelIncident table is limited by the 30 day KQL History of the Advanced Hunting experience.
The first screenshot is from the Defender XDR Portal and the second screenshot is from Sentinel. You’ll observe the data is identical, and I was able to use the same KQL query:

SecurityIncident

| where CreatedTime > ago(365d)

| summarize  min(CreatedTime),max(CreatedTime), count()

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You can also create Analytics Rules from within the Defender Advanced Hunting interface:

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The components that are now “Unified” between Defender and Sentinel are:

  • Overview
  • Unified Incidents
  • Unified Entities
  • Advanced Hunting

Key benefits are summarized in the Microsoft Documentation (here).

The following capabilities are only in the Sentinel Portal:

  • Tasks
  • Adding an entity to threat indicators
  • Automation
  • Workspace Manager

Otherwise the Documentation page does a great job at mapping where to find Sentinel features inside the new Unified Portal:

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Uninstalling (Roll Back)

This is possible in the Defender XDR Portal by disconnecting the Workspace. It is not clear to me whether you would have to re-enable the Defender Incident Creation rules in Sentinel.

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Final Thoughts

The expanded Advanced Hunting experience and being able to stay within a single console without having to bounce back and forth between Sentinel and Defender makes this a compelling integration. My initial concern about impact to MSSP’s was alleviated by testing in our own Azure Lighthouse environment.

Purchase and Deploy Microsoft Security Copilot

Beginning April 1st, 2024, you can now purchase and deploy Microsoft Security Copilot. The setup process takes less than 5 minutes to complete.
I am going to share my experience of setting it up and some considerations for post installation.

Prerequisites

– An Azure Subscription

– Authority to spend at least $2,880 per month
(this is the minimum price to get started)

– Security Administrator or Global Administrator permissions

– At least one of the following technologies already deployed: Defender for Endpoint, Sentinel, Intune, Entra, or Purview.

Installing Copilot for Security

 https://securitycopilot.microsoft.com/tour/admin

Here are the screen shots of the setup process:

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Managing Security Copilot is then performed at: https://securitycopilot.microsoft.com

When you first sign-in, you are greeted with some adoption guidance:

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You then pick a theme:

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You are reminded that your information is protected.

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You are then greeted.

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You are then given a walkthrough. If you scroll down then you will see the prompt bar below the Chat window.

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Don’t know what to type in? There is a button to click on with sample prompts.

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Here are some of the “Prompt Books” to try out:

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Then there is a whole long list of “System Capabilities” which are based on the plug-ins that you have setup.

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There are probably about 100 more to select from.

Role Based Access Control

Copilot for Security roles

Copilot for Security introduces two roles that function like access groups but aren’t Microsoft Entra ID roles. Instead, they are application roles inside Copilot.

  • Copilot owner
  • Copilot contributor

The following Microsoft Entra roles automatically inherit Copilot owner access, and these cannot be removed:

  • Security Administrator
  • Global Administrator

The following Microsoft Entra roles automatically inherit Copilot Contributor access, and these cannot be removed:

  • Security Operator
  • Security Reader

“By default, All users in the Microsoft Entra tenant are given Copilot contributor access.” Say what??

This can’t be right? Why would all users in your company need contributor rights to Copilot? The documentation page for Copilot for Security does not attempt to rationalize this default setting.

So the first thing to do is restrict who can create Copilot sessions, since the Security Compute Unit is not cheap and you want to control costs. Therefore, to customize the RBAC and remove the Everyone Group from having Contributor rights navigate to the Role Assignment page here:

https://securitycopilot.microsoft.com/role-assignment

Then expand contributor and click remove to the right of “Everyone.”

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Or if you want to navigate to this page manually, here are the navigation instructions:

  • Select the home menu.
  • Select Role assignment  > expand contributor and click remove next to “Everyone”
  • Note: You can add B2B Guests or your MSSP access to administer or use Copilot.

Getting Started

I selected the “Microsoft Defender Incident Investigation” Prompt Book.

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After typing in an Incident ID, I then ran the prompt book. The prompt book contained the following 7 prompts, but it also gave me an option to change or add prompts. When I clicked “Run” it then ran these prompts in sequence. I am noting the elapsed time that each prompt took to complete:

1. Summarize Defender incident <DEFENDER_INCIDENT_ID>. (21 Seconds elapsed)

2. Tell me about the entities associated with that incident. (22 seconds)

3. What are the reputation scores for the IPv4 addresses on that incident? (8 seconds)

4. Show the authentication methods setup for each user involved in that incident. Especially indicate whether they have MFA enabled. (36 seconds)

5. If a user is listed in the incident details, show which devices they have used recently and indicate whether they are compliant with policies. (25 seconds)

6.If any devices are listed in the previous output, show details from Intune on the one that checked in most recently. Especially indicate if it is current on all operating system updates. (19 seconds)

7. Write an executive report summarizing this investigation. It should be suited for a non-technical audience. (55 seconds)

So in total, it took just over 3 minutes to run the three prompts and produce the following executive report:

# Executive Summary of Security Incident


On April 1, 2024, a security incident of medium severity occurred involving a user named ‘John Doe’. The incident was triggered by multiple failed login attempts to the cloud application Microsoft 365.


## Incident Details


The incident was titled ‘Multiple failed user log on attempts to an app involving one user’. It was first detected at 15:45:38 UTC on April 1, 2024. As of now, the incident remains open and is yet to be classified.


## User Details


The user involved in this incident, ‘John Doe’, has multiple authentication methods set up, including password authentication, Microsoft Authenticator, and FIDO2 Authentication Method. This indicates that the user has Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled, adding an extra layer of security to their account.


## Device Details


The user ‘John Doe’ has been recently using a device named ‘device-name’. This device is a Microsoft Corporation Cloud PC Enterprise 8vCPU/32GB/512GB running Windows 10.0.22631.3296. The device is compliant with the policies, indicating that it meets the security standards set by the organization.


## Current Status


As of now, no investigation, remediation, or follow-up actions have been taken on this incident. The incident remains open and is being monitored for any further suspicious activities.


This report aims to provide a high-level overview of the incident. Further technical details can be provided if necessary.”

First Impressions

My first impression was the setup process was fast, simple and efficient. I had no prior training and was able to complete the setup in minutes. The guided walkthrough had me understanding and using promptbooks immediately.

My only criticism is that the prompt book question:
“What are the reputation scores for the IPv4 addresses on that incident?” was unable to find the actual IP addresses associated with the failed sign-in attempts. Even after I re-wrote the prompt to a more complete one as follows:

“What are the reputation scores for the IPv4 addresses on that incident? If no IPv4 addresses are associated with the incident, then lookup recent sign-ins to see if you can identify which sign-ins could be related to this incident. For example, if this incident had to do with multiple failed login attempts, then find failed sign-ins in the Entra or UAL Logs around the same time this incident was created”

The result on the 2nd attempt was:
”Unfortunately, there were no IPv4 addresses associated with the incident titled ‘Multiple failed user log on attempts to an app’ involving user ‘john doe’ and the cloud application Microsoft 365 that occurred at 2024-04-01 15:45:38 UTC.

Additionally, no recent sign-ins were found that could be related to this incident. This could be because the system automatically defaults to a 24-hour time lookup based on the provided or current date and time.

Please provide a specific time range which contains the desired results or consider rephrasing the request.”

This was not helpful, because the failed sign-ins were only 8 hours ago.

So my 3rd attempt at finding what IP address was associated with the failed logon attempts was to leave the Security Copilot page and go back to the M365 Defender XDR Portal (security.microsoft.com) and see if Copilot can help me write some KQL to find the IP and see if it is the user’s normal historical IP.

Here was the prompt I gave Copilot in the Advanced Hunting interface:
”find all failed logins from John Doe in the last 24 hours and determine if they are anomalous. for example, are they from his normal device ID or his normal IP addresses he has used in the past successful logins?

It generated KQL to find successful sign-ins from Devices and IP’s and then it compared that to unsuccessful sign-ins.

let successful_logins = IdentityLogonEvents
| where AccountUpn == [email protected] and Timestamp > ago(24h) and FailureReason == ""
| summarize make_set(DeviceId), make_set(IPAddress);
IdentityLogonEvents
| where AccountUpn == "[email protected]" and Timestamp > ago(24h) and FailureReason != ""
| extend IsAnomalousDevice = iff(DeviceId in (successful_logins), false, true)
| extend IsAnomalousIP = iff(IPAddress in (successful_logins), false, true)
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, IPAddress, IsAnomalousDevice, IsAnomalousIP

It gave me the option to Run the Query, or add it to the Editor.

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It failed from the start because DeviceID does not exist in the IdentityLogonEvents table. This table contains events from Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps, as well as events from Microsoft Defender for Identity, but it does not capture the non interactive sign-ins from Microsoft Entra.
It should have used the AADSignInEventsBeta table which contains the interactive AadDeviceId column, and other valuable device details such as DeviceTrustType, IsManaged, IsCompliant, etc which are more helpful when trying to determine if failed sign-ins are concerning. 
Note: The AADSignInEventsBeta requires EntraP2, which I have, but not all customers may have. I would expect Copilot to know I am licensed for this and suggest the best table to use. The documentation page for this table states that all this enhanced schema information will eventually move over to the IdentityLogonEvents table.

The query that ran gave this error:

Error message
‘summarize’ operator: Failed to resolve scalar expression named ‘DeviceId’

How to resolve
Fix semantic errors in your query
Now, someone who knows KQL can resolve this but a newbie is going to struggle a bit here. I swapped out DeviceId with DeviceName and the query ran but returned no results, which was odd.
On closer inspection, it used a case sensitive “==” operator. The username was lowercase in the logs, so it did not find a match on the sentence-case “John Doe.” I reported my results to Microsoft that the default should use the case insensitive =~ operator.
Once I corrected the syntax then it returned some pretty cool results. I liked how it presented the table allowing me to visualize all the unusual logons. I added the Location to detect unusual logons.
Here is the updated query that uses DeviceID:

let
successful_logins = AADSignInEventsBeta

|
where AccountUpn =~ “John Doe” and Timestamp  >
ago(7d) and ErrorCode  == 0

|
summarize make_set(AadDeviceId), make_set(IPAddress);

AADSignInEventsBeta

|
where AccountUpn =~ “John Doe” and Timestamp  >
ago(24h) and ErrorCode  != 0

|
extend IsAnomalousDevice = iff(AadDeviceId  in (successful_logins), false,
true)

|
extend IsAnomalousIP = iff(IPAddress in (successful_logins), false,
true)

|
project Timestamp , DeviceName , IPAddress, IsAnomalousDevice, IsAnomalousIP,
City

Monitoring Usage

It is important to learn how to monitor and manage the use of security compute units in Copilot for Security. You’ll want to keep an eye on usage of Copilot, to make sure you stay within the boundaries of what you are paying for. You can monitor usage on this reporting site here: https://securitycopilot.microsoft.com/usage-monitoring

It was surprising to me to see my casual exploration on a single security incident exceed the usage threshold of 1 SCU Unit.

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I ran five total Copilot interactions over a 60 minute period (working on a single case and had it generate some KQL.)

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Therefore, based on my experience, you would need to budget for 1 SCU Unit per SOC Analyst ($35k per SCU) if they will continuously use Copilot for Security. Otherwise the SOC analyst may get a notification in the middle of an investigation that they need to wait an hour, or contact the stingy admin to buy more SCU units.

Here is what the documentation page states:
”When an analyst is in the middle of an investigation and the usage is nearing the provisioned capacity limit, a notification is displayed to the analyst in response to a prompt… When the provisioned security compute unit is crossed, the analyst will see an error message stating that due to high usage in the organization Copilot can’t respond to requests. Analysts can’t submit additional prompts at this time. More capacity would become available in the next hour.”

It’s unfortunate that a SOC analyst in the middle of triaging an event may have to wait an hour before having enough capacity or making the business decide whether or not to pay an additional ~$35,000 per year for another SCU Compute unit.

Feature Request

I would like to see a feature where there is an emergency buffer that can be used for SOC analysts to ‘burst’ or ‘borrow’ from SCU compute times. Imagine a scenario where you have a single SOC Analyst working 8 to 5pm. Wouldn’t it be great if they could consume the SCU usage from after hours and get to use that horsepower during normal business hours? Otherwise those after hours SCU units would go to waste if that organization does not have an after hours SOC.


Microsoft Copilot for Security Pricing

Microsoft Secure 2024 was a digital two-hour event held on 3/13/2024. If you missed the event, you can watch the recording on demand (here).

The big news was that Microsoft Copilot for Security will be released for general availability on April 1st 2024. The announcement for GA is located (here).

Pricing was announced in a separate Tech Community post (here).

“Copilot for Security capacity is anticipated to be billed monthly via a new Security Compute Unit (SCU) at the rate of $4/hr.”

Interested customers are encouraged to reach out to their Microsoft sales executive for more information.

It is no surprise that Artificial Intelligence can help security analysts work faster and more efficient. Microsoft released the results of an economic study which confirmed these expectations. This new study focused on experienced security professionals and expands the randomized controlled trial published last November, which focused on new-in-career security professionals. Both studies measured the effects on productivity when analysts performed security tasks using Copilot for Security compared to a control group that did not.

  • Experienced security analysts were 22% faster with Copilot.
  • New analysts were 34% more accurate at script analysis with Copilot.
  • They were 7% more accurate across all tasks when using Copilot.
  • And, most notably, 97% said they want to use Copilot the next time they do the same task.

The four critical security tasks that Copilot will deliver at the time of release will be:

Incident Summarization

Gain context for incidents and improve communication across your organization by leveraging generative AI to swiftly distill complex security alerts into concise, actionable summaries, which then enables quicker response times and streamlined decision-making.

Impact Analysis

Utilize AI-driven analytics to assess the potential impact of security incidents, offering insights into affected systems and data to prioritize response efforts effectively.

Reverse Engineering of Scripts

Eliminate the need to manually reverse engineer malware and enable every analyst to understand the actions executed by attackers. Analyze complex command line scripts and translate them into natural language with clear explanations of actions. Efficiently extract and link indicators found in the script to their respective entities in your environment.

Guided Response

Receive actionable step-by-step guidance for incident response, including directions for triage, investigation, containment, and remediation. Relevant deep links to recommended actions allow for quicker response.

Reference Tech Community Blog (here).

Learn More

Microsoft Copilot for Security

Solutions that include Copilot

Error: "You don’t have access to this" could be from Device Code CA Policy

I consider myself an early adopter of most Microsoft security controls, not just to protect our own organization, but with the goal to help the community understand the potential benefits and impacts of various configuration options.

After I enabled the new Entra Conditional Access “Authentication Flows” block policy, my mobile phone could no longer sign into the Outlook for iOS or Teams mobile applications.

The error message I received was “You don’t have access to this. Your sign-in was successful but does not meet the criteria to access this resource. For example, you might be signing in from a browser, app, location, or an authentication flow that is restricted by your admin.”

That’ when I knew that the change I had rolled out about 6 hours earlier was probably the culprit. I immediately reported the findings to Microsoft and began working with the product group to identify the root cause. Essentially, the behavior is expected if the mobile phone apps were registered using one of these flows.

Device code flow is required when signing into devices that might lack local input for eg meeting room devices or scenarios like shared devices. But in some cases, mobile phones can use these flows to register apps like Authenticator in Passwordless mode.

My recommendation is to enable this policy in ‘Report Only Mode’ OR review the past sign-ins to see if these events have been happening in your environment.

In the Entra Sign-in logs you can now filter for authentication flows to see if which users are signing in with these flows.

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The quick fix would be to exclude the users who may be affected. In my organization, it was just one user who was impacted. If you want to get more granular on the exclusion, exempt only the specific device ID’s from the DCF CA policy and then create a second standalone “require compliant device” for those specific device ID’s (assuming they are corporate owned devices). Essentially, whenever there’s a “require compliant device” policy in place, DCF is automatically blocked. This is because MSFT cannot verify the registration state of devices as part of the DCF flow. Thus, a managed device pass the compliant device requirement but any further DCF attempts should be blocked for that specific device. For unmanaged BYOD devices, then you normally can’t use the “require compliant device” policy since that would require full MDM device enrollment (most organizations with BYOD policies cannot or do not want to fully manage a personal device).

Merill Fernando (@Merill) posted on his X account a helpful diagram on why blocking Device Code Flow is important.

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References:

Microsoft Documentation: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-authentication-flows

Dirk-jan Mollema (@dirkjan) https://dirkjanm.io/phishing-for-microsoft-entra-primary-refresh-tokens/

@fabian_bader’s blog post https://cloudbrothers.info/en/protect-users-device-code-flow-abuse/

Guarding the Gatekeepers: Combatting UEFI-Bypassing Bootkits with Practical Cybersecurity Measures

Imagine wiping your computer clean, thinking you’ve washed away every digital threat. But what if the infection persisted, hidden deep within the very core of your system? That’s the chilling reality of bootkits, a class of malware that burrows into the foundational firmware, surviving even after a factory reset.

In 2018, LoJax, one of the first publicly discovered UEFI rootkits was attributed by Trend Micro to threat actor APT28 (aka Fancy Bear).  LoJax demonstrated an alarming level of sophistication. This malware, capable of embedding itself deep within the UEFI firmware, challenged the very notion of a ‘clean system’. LoJax’s ability to persist even after hard drive replacements and OS reinstallation underlined a new era in persistent threats.

LoJax’s modus operandi involved rewriting the UEFI’s flash memory, which typically requires administrative privileges. Presumably it would be combined with zero day vulns that would escalate privilege to local administrator. Once installed, it granted attackers persistent access to the infected system, enabling them to execute malicious code at a deeply embedded level, outside the reach of traditional antivirus solutions and even OS-level security measures.

In March 2023, BlackLotus, another formidable player in the bootkit arena, was found being sold on hacking forums for $5,000, dating back to October 2022. It exploits CVE-2022-21894 to bypass UEFI Secure Boot and establish persistence. Although Microsoft patched the vulnerability in their January 2022 update, exploitation remained feasible as the affected, validly signed binaries had not been added to the UEFI revocation list. Once installed, BlackLotus deploys a kernel driver to shield the bootkit from removal and an HTTP downloader for communication with its command and control (C&C) servers, capable of loading additional payloads.

So, how do we outsmart these stealthy intruders? Here are your weapons of choice:

Understanding the Battlefield:

1. UEFI Secure Boot: This is still your first line of defense. This technology verifies the legitimacy of code before executing it during startup, preventing unauthorized programs like bootkits from taking root. While not foolproof, it’s a significant wall to scale. You can create an Intune Compliance policy that requires all systems must have Secure Boot enabled. While this would not have prevented Lojax or BlackLotus, it increases the cost and effort for attackers to bypass this safeguard.
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2. Regular Firmware Updates: Patching vulnerabilities in your BIOS/UEFI firmware is crucial. Tools like Windows Autopatch (managed by Intune) can automate this process, keeping your system fortified against known exploits.
Browse to Intune.Microsoft.com, Devices > Driver updates for Windows 10 and later.

3. UEFI Scanners: Some antivirus programs, like Microsoft Defender, offer scanners for UEFI threats, searching for hidden malware in the deepest corners of your system. Microsoft introduced their embedded scanner inside Defender back in June 2020, learn more here.

Beyond Fortification: Intelligent Vigilance

1. Behavioral Anomaly Detection: Monitor outbound network traffic for anomalies. Such anomalies could indicate compromised firmware attempting to communicate with its command and control servers.

2. Threat Hunting: Employ dedicated personnel or tools to scan for suspicious processes and network connections. Cobalt Strike, a tool used by both security researchers and cybercriminals, is difficult to detect but not impossible. Look for suspicious processes (“winlogon.exe”, “rundll32.exe”, etc.) opening network connections to public IP addresses (see additional guidance here and here). Even in a dll side-loading attack, if Microsoft Teams is suddenly communicating with a CDN network out of the usual, that could be an indicator of compromise.

3. Application Allow-listing: This proactive approach restricts application execution to only pre-approved programs, potentially preventing bootkits from infiltrating in the first place. Patriot has a webinar on this topic on January 16th, 2024 here, also available to watch on-demand later.
Agenda:

1) AppLocker – Finally free after 14 years
2) Defender Application Control – It’s complicated…
3) AppLocker vs Defender Application Control – how about both?
4) Smart App Control – Not as smart as you want it to be
5) App Control for Business – Is this the promised land?

Remember:

– These advanced bootkits might exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, bypassing even non-admin users when chained with other exploits that escalate privs.
– Stay informed about emerging threats and keep your security arsenal updated.
– Vigilance is key. Don’t assume a clean system is completely safe.

Ushering in a Passwordless Era: Why Microsoft Passkeys are the Future of Secure Logins

For years, passwords have served as the primary gatekeeper to our digital lives. However, their inherent vulnerabilities – susceptibility to phishing attacks, data breaches, and user negligence – have become increasingly evident. Enter Passkeys, a game-changing innovation poised to revolutionize login security and user convenience.

“Based on FIDO standards, passkeys are a replacement for passwords that provide faster, easier, and more secure sign-ins to websites and apps across a user’s devices. Unlike passwords, passkeys are always strong and phishing-resistant.​
Passkeys simplify account registration for apps and websites, are easy to use, work across most of a user’s devices, and even work on other devices within physical proximity.​” FIDO2 Alliance

Passkeys mark a significant departure from the traditional password paradigm. Instead of relying on memorizable strings, they leverage cryptography and biometrics to create unique, tamper-proof keys for each website or application. This eliminates the need for password managers, reduces the attack surface for phishing scams, and minimizes the risk of credential stuffing attacks.

Beyond enhanced security, Passkeys offer compelling benefits for both IT professionals and users:

For IT Professionals:

  • Reduced Costs: Eliminate the need for purchasing and managing physical FIDO2 keys, streamlining device provisioning and user onboarding.
  • Simplified Administration: Leverage Entra ID (Azure AD) for centralized management and deployment of Passkeys across your organization.
  • Enhanced Security Posture: Eliminate password-related vulnerabilities and leverage multi-factor authentication (MFA) capabilities within Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) for even greater protection.

For Users:

  • Unmatched Convenience: Seamlessly access applications across devices with biometric authentication or a PIN, eliminating the need for remembering and typing complex passwords.
  • Improved Productivity: Reduce time spent managing passwords, allowing users to focus on more productive tasks.
  • Mobile Device Support: Enjoy seamless Passkey authentication on Android and iOS devices, empowering your mobile workforce.

While concerns regarding the security of Passkeys compared to non-exportable physical FIDO2 security keys might arise, it’s crucial to understand that the private key in the passkey never leaves your device (in theory). They are heavily encrypted both in storage and during transmission, and WHfB adds an additional layer of protection through its advanced MFA capabilities.

Microsoft’s commitment to continuous security updates and improvements further mitigates concerns, ensuring your data remains secure. Additionally, Passkeys address the long-standing challenge of integrating mobile phones with physical FIDO2 keys, offering a seamless and secure login experience for your mobile workforce.

In conclusion, Microsoft support for Passkeys represent a significant leap forward in login security and user convenience. By eliminating password-related vulnerabilities, streamlining device management, and enhancing user experience, Passkeys pave the way for a more secure and productive work environment.

For organizations that have not rolled out physical FIDO2 keys to all end users, my advice would be to wait until passkeys become more supported in the very near future. However, I would not wait to provide physical FIDO2 security keys to Privileged IT Administrators, who can use them now to protect themselves against phishing, especially when combined with Authentication Strengths in Conditional Access Policies.

Windows 11 Support

Instead of using a username and password to access a website or application, Windows 11 users will be able to use and protect passkeys using Windows Hello or Windows Hello for Business, or their phone. This will allow users to access the site or app using their face, fingerprint, or device PIN. Passkeys on Windows 11 will work on multiple browsers including Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome, Firefox, and others. Setting up a passkey in Windows is accomplished by:

  • The website or application owner creates a passkey and offers it to you as a sign-in option instead of your password—website and app owners will need to develop their own passkeys infrastructure on their sign-in experience.
  • Once you create the passkey on your device, the next time you sign in to that website or app from your device it will recognize that you have its passkey, and you can use it instead of a password. If you are using Windows Hello or Windows Hello for Business, you will be able to use your face, PIN, or fingerprint to sign in more easily. In addition, you can now use a passkey from your phone or tablet to complete the sign-in process.
  • Users will have a management dashboard through Settings –> Accounts –> Passkeys to see and manage passkeys on their Windows 11 device.

Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/09/26/new-security-features-in-windows-11-protect-users-and-empower-it/

QR Code Phishing

[Update 12/12/2023 -Microsoft may be the first email security vendor to extract malicious hyperlinks from QR codes. This is a remarkable engineering feat, something I did not think they would accomplish until Q1 of next year.
here is the Microsoft article: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-office/protect-your-organizations-against-qr-code-phishing-with/ba-p/4007041]

We are seeing an increased number of QR Codes used in phishing.

TL;DR, there are no technology solutions available on the market today to detect or block QR code phishing, aka “quishing.”  We recommend informing users not to use their cameras to scan QR codes unless they have verbally authenticated the sender (they know and expect the QR code for a valid business purpose).

Stu Sjouwerman, CEO of KnowBe4 wrote, “I’m not aware of any security solution that can follow a QR code-based URL to determine if the resulting URL is malicious or not” (KnowBe4 email newsletter)

The way to limit your risk if they do is to setup a conditional access policy that blocks authentication from personally owned mobile devices. Clearly, that would be a big policy shift that would require planning and communication for most organizations.

Here is an example QR code phishing email from from November 15th

SNAGHTML4971df8a

My colleague Chris Lehr created a transport rule to try to detect QR codes.
https://twitter.com/chrislehratx/status/1709288477526028346

(Disclaimer: Due to false positives, test this out on a small pilot group, and set the ETR action to pre-pend the phrase “Possible QR Code Phishing:” that would be inserted in front of whatever the message subject is to get the end-user’s attention.

Chris was also successful in having Microsoft update their documentation to reflect that they are not yet able to block malicious QR codes (yet). An earlier version of their documentation stated that MDO blocked malicious QR codes, but in our testing we confirmed it did not. https://twitter.com/chrislehratx/status/1707137624694313375

Microsoft is actively working on a fix but we do not yet have an ETA.

References:
https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/major-us-energy-org-targeted-in-qr-code-phishing-attack/
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fbi-warns-of-malicious-qr-codes-used-to-steal-your-money/
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/technology/pages/qr-code-phishing-attacks-spread.aspx#:~:text=The%20campaign%2C%20discovered%20by%20Cofense,to%20steal%20their%20Microsoft%20credentials.
https://intelligence.abnormalsecurity.com/blog/qr-code-campaign-bypass-security
https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2023/08/qr-codes-deployed-in-targeted-phishing-campaigns
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365-life-hacks/privacy-and-safety/five-common-qr-code-scams

Microsoft and ProofPoint capture 72% of the Fortune 500 Email Security Market

Microsoft has gained 20% in the last 12 months of the customers that make up the Fortune 500. ProofPoint’s growth over the same period was just 9%.
So even though ProofPoint has almost half the email security market, Microsoft is steadily growing at a faster clip than ProofPoint. All other email security vendors have declined over the past 12 months.

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The two vendors make up for 72% of all the Fortune 500.

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For my past blog posts on tracking the DNS records of the Fortune 500, including the ten reasons why I recommend Microsoft email security to my clients, click (here)

How to get a job in cybersecurity

White Belt: Basic Computer Skills
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Basics of computer hardware and software: Spend a few weeks getting familiar with how computers work, both in terms of hardware and software. Free resources like Khan Academy’s Computer Science course can be a great starting point.

Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for 2 weeks.

Operating Systems: Learn about both Windows and Linux operating systems. The Linux Journey website offers free lessons.

Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for 4 weeks.

White Belt Test:
Make a bootable USB drive and load the Windows operating system from scratch using only Google Search as a guide.

Make a bootable USB drive and load the Kali Linux operating system from scratch using only Google Search as a guide.

Blue Belt: Networking and Cybersecurity Fundamentals
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Networking: Learn the basics of networking – IP addressing, routers and switches, TCP/IP model etc. Cisco’s Networking Academy provides a free Introduction to Networks course.

Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for 6 weeks.

Cybersecurity basics: Start learning about cybersecurity principles and practices with Cybrary’s free beginner courses.

Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for 4 weeks.

Blue Belt Test: Obtain the CompTIA A+ Certification: This will validate your understanding of IT infrastructure, networking and cybersecurity. Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for 4 weeks.

Purple Belt: Advanced Cybersecurity Skills and Coding
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Obtain the CompTIA Network+ Certification: This certification will prove your networking skills, including troubleshooting, configuring, and managing networks.

Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for 6 weeks.

Brown Belt: Coding Basics

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Learn PowerShell and Python, which are widely used in cybersecurity. Websites like YouTube, Codecademy, SoloLearn offer free courses.

Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for 8 weeks.

Black Belt: CompTIA Security+ Certification
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This certification will validate your baseline skills to perform core security functions. This is the minimum certification necessary to obtain an entry level position in the field of Cybersecurity. However, you must have mastered the prior belts first otherwise this exam will make little sense for you.

Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for 6 weeks.

You should begin to practice cybersecurity with gamified sites like TryHackMe to apply what you’ve learned.

At this stage you can build your own lab environment, building computers or virtual machines to “hack” so that you can learn how to defend against the hacks. Like a person playing chess against themselves.

Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for ongoing practice.

Master Cycle: Networking and Job Hunting

You are now ready to practice some reflex development and start rubbing elbows. Follow people on LinkedIN and Twitter. Join Cybersecurity Groups. Join online forums and communities such as Information Security Stack Exchange, CyberSec Forum, and subreddits like r/cybersecurity and r/netsec. Learn the lingo and language, ask for advice, and never quit.

After you have landed your first job in cybersecurity, your journey has JUST BEGUN. After your first year, you can choose a specialization and focus to earn your first stripe.

Black Belt Stripe 1: Specialization and Hands-on Experience

Specialization: Choose an area in cybersecurity to specialize in (for example, ethical hacking, forensics, audits). Cybrary, Udemy, and YouTube have free and paid courses.

Time Investment: 2-3 hours a day, 5 days a week for 6-8 weeks.

Continuous Learning

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Cybersecurity is like Jiu Jitzu in many ways. First, your enemy is always advancing their skills, so you must not become complacent. You will become a life-long student of the craft. People will pay you good money to keep their systems safe. Second, if you do not practice often, you will forget your skills. Don’t start this unless you can finish it.

Count the Costs

If you add up all the time from each belt, you are looking at a year of studying and learning before you would be ready to apply to your first entry level position in cybersecurity. The best things in life are never easy. If you are passionate about this field, the rewards will be tremendous.

“Suppose one of you wants to build a tower. Won’t you first sit down and estimate the cost to see if you have enough money to complete it? For if you lay the foundation and are not able to finish it, everyone who sees it will ridicule you, saying, ‘This person began to build and wasn’t able to finish.’ “Or suppose a king is about to go to war against another king. Won’t he first sit down and consider whether he is able with ten thousand men to oppose the one coming against him with twenty thousand?” – Luke 14:28-31

Why you need to enable Multi Admin Approval in Intune

Intune has a new feature called Multi Admin Approval (MAA) which is extremely important to enable because it reduces the risk that an attacker who compromises an Intune Admin can use that privilege to distribute ransomware to all endpoints. A memory trick to always remember this is imagine your sibling shouting “MAAAAA!” when you are doing something wrong. That is like what should happen when an admin account is taken over, goes rogue and tries to distribute ransomware in your environment – someone should be shouting MAA!!! Lol!

You can navigate to this important control here:
https://endpoint.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_Intune_DeviceSettings/TenantAdminMenu/~/multiAdminApproval

To create an access policy, your account must be assigned the Intune Service Administrator or Azure Global Administrator role.

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You will need to create two separate access policies, one for Apps and one for Scripts.

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Select the group containing the members who can approve requests for create, edit, assign, and delete scripts.

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When any Intune admin attempts to create or change a script/app that is protected by an MAA access policy, Intune will queue the request after the user enters a business justification as shown here:

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Intune won’t apply the change until a different account explicitly approves it.
Approvers can see the requests in Intune Tenant Admin > Multi Admin Approval
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Only administrators who are members of an approval group that’s assigned a protected resource in an access protection policy can approve changes. Approvers can also reject change requests.

This feature is in public preview, but it is pretty awesome!!

To learn more about what happens next, such as what the requestor and approval experience, check out the Microsoft documentation here:

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/fundamentals/multi-admin-approval